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Abstract 
We study party formation in a general model of collective decision- 
making, modeling parties as agglomerations of policy positions champi- 
oned by decision-makers. We show that if there are economies of  party 
size and the policy chosen is not beaten by another policy in pairwise 
voting, then players agglomerate into exactly two parties.  This result 
does not depend on the magnitude of  the economies of  party size or 
sensitively  on the nature of the individuals'  preferences.  Our  analy- 
sis encompasses a wide range of  models, including decision-making in 
committees with costly participation and representative democracy in 
which the legislature is elected by citizens. 
*Osborne:  Department  of  Economics,  150 St. George  Street, University of  Toronto, 
Toronto,  Canada  M5S  3G7;  Mart  in.  OsborneOutoronto  .  ca; http  :  //ww, economics. 
utoronto.  ca/osborne/. Tourky:  Department  of Economics, University  of  Melbourne, 
Melbourne 3010, Australia; rtourkyQunimelb.  edu. au;  http:  //www.purnima.  net/rabee/. 
Osborne started this research during a visit to the University of  Melbourne, and continued 
it during a visit to the Australian National University. He thanks both institutions for their 
generous hospitality.  He also gratefully acknowledges financiaJ.support from the Connaught 
Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of  Canada.  Tourky 
is grateful for financial support from the Australian Research Council. 
Copyright @ 2002 by Martin J. Osborne and Rabee Tourky, 1.  Introduction 
Many societies make collective decisions in legislative assemblies in which the 
policies chosen are compromises that depend on the policies championed by the 
legislators. In these assemblies, legislators tend to be grouped into LLparties". 
Under what circumstances do parties form?  What determines the number of 
parties? What positions do the parties take? 
We  model political parties as agglomerations of  positions championed by 
decision makers.  A group of  legislators constitutes a party when all members 
support and vote for the same position  ("party discipline".)  We  focus on a 
classical reason for agglomeration:  economies of  scale.  In societies in which 
an electoral process generates a set of  decision-makers  (legislators), the oper- 
ating cost of  a party derives in part from an extra-parliamentary organization 
whose main role is to rally support in election times. Economies of scale may 
exist because some costs have  a fixed component  (e.g. advertising, registra- 
tion), organizational economies exist  (e.g. the average cost of  ensuring that 
supporters of potential legislators are registered voters may decline with party 
membership), and large parties get disproportionate public subsidies. 
We  assume that the policy enacted by  the legislature is the outcome of 
voting.  Each legislator champions a position, and the policy enacted  is one 
that does not lose to any other under majority rule pairwise voting. We assume 
that political issues can be  arrayed from left to right  on a  one-dimensional 
spectrum, so the policy enacted by the legislature is the median of the positions 
championed by legislators.' 
We  formulate a general model of  collective decision-making, rather than 
starting with a detailed model tailored to a specific setting.  A  key  finding 
is that is that exactly  two  parties form, and these parties  are of  equal or 
almost equal size.  This agglomeration does not depend on the magnitude of 
the economies  of  party size  or sensitively  on the nature of  the individuals' 
'The  median is, more generally, the only subgame perfect  equilibrium outcome of  any 
"binary agenda"  (a  procedure in which the outcome is the result of  a sequence of  pairwise 
votes) in which the players use weakly undominated strategies (see, for example, Miller 1995, 
Section 6.3). preferences.  Our model has several applications, including collective decision- 
making in committees with costly participation and legislative decision-making 
when legislators are elected by  citizens.  The latter model applies to a large 
class of  electoral processes, including proportional representation and majority 
rule. 
Some history 
The evolution of  Britain's two-party system motivates our model  Prior 
to the Great Reform Act  of  1832, the English parliament was partitioned into 
two loosely knit groups, the reformist Whigs and the conservative Tories; little 
extra-parliamentary party machinery existed.  Further, most bills were  local 
or personal, and party discipline was minimal, 
In the unreformed electoral system of  Hanoverian England, a member of 
the hlite faced an essentially fixed personal cost  to joining  parliament.  The 
cost structure changed with the reform acts of  1832, 1867, and 1884, which 
lead to the evolution of  a solidly two-party system-initially  Conservative and 
Liberal, later Conservative and Labour.  These reform acts afforded changes 
that played an important part in the development of  modern political parties. 
The reforms were,  broadly,  three-fold:  the expansion  of  the fran~hise;~  the 
annual compilation of  a voter registry; and the adoption of  simple plurality 
rule within the electoral process.4 
For our purposes, the most  relevant  consequence of  these reforms is that 
they introduced  significant economies of  scale and meant that average par- 
ticipation costs for parliamentarians could be reduced by supporting a party. 
First, the large increase in the size of the electorate and the introduction of plu- 
rality rule meant that a candidate had to rally support to get into parliament. 
20~r  historical account draws on O'Gorman  (1989) and Ball (1987). 
3The 1832 Act increased the electorate by almost 50%, that of  1867 increased it by 38% 
in counties and 13% in boroughs, that of  1884 increased it by  66%, and that of  1918 (which 
enfranchised all women over 30) increased it by around 50% (Ball 1987, pp. 18, 24). 
41n 1866, prior to the reforms of  1867, half the members of the House of  Commons were 
elected by  one fifth of  the electorate (Ball 1987, p. 21), so that these members had to do 
little work in terms of rallying support to get into parliament. Second, the introduction of  a voter registry introduced clear administrative 
costs to rallying support---costs  that could be shared within a party.  Indeed, 
by the 1880's  "most of  the energies of  the party agents and the bulk of party 
election funds were devoted to filling the electoral register with one set of sup- 
porters and stripping the same register of the opposing voters through the 
Registration Courts"  (Ball 1987, p. 20; see also p. 26).5 
This evolution of  a political party system was intra-parliamentary in the 
sense that existing members of  parliament grouped themselves into parties. 
By  contrast,  the later  emergence  of  the  British  Labour  Party  was  extra- 
parliamentary:  it resulted mainly from the work of grass-root  activists from 
the working class who were enfranchised by the 1918 Reform Act. Our model 
contributes to the explanation of  both types of  party formation. 
Framework 
We  study a model of  collective decision-making in which each of  a finite num- 
ber of  players  chooses whether  or not to participate in the decision-making 
process, and if  so which policy to champion. We  assume that the policy space 
is completely ordered (e.g. there is a single issue, or many issues ordered lexi- 
cographically), and that the outcome is the median of  the policies championed 
by the participants. 
We  make two basic assumptions about the players'  payoff  functions, the 
first of which generalizes the idea that participation is costly. 
C  (costly participation) If  a participating player's switching to nonpartici- 
pation does not change the outcome, then her pago#  increases. 
This condition is satisfied in a model of committee voting in which players 
incur a cost if  they choose to participate and care about the policy chosen, 
because a player whose participation does not affect the outcome can profitably 
5The cost of registering supporters and opposing the registration of opponents' supporters 
was associated with the complex eligibility requirements.  Political parties litigated against 
the inclusion of  their  opponents' supporters and in defense of  the inclusion of  their own 
supporters. withdraw and save the cost of participation. It is satisfied also in a richer two- 
stage model in which citizens elect legislators to an assembly, 
Our second basic assumption is that there are economies of party size. We 
consider three variants of  this assumption. 
E  (economies of party  size) If  a participant's  switching to a  larger party 
does not change the median championed policy, then her pay08 increases. 
This condition holds in the example of  com- 
a 
@a  a  a  mittee voting when the cost of  belonging to a 
t 
party decreases with the party's size. It is illus- 
trated in Figure 1, in which the horizontal line 
is the policy space, each dot is the policy cham- 
Figure  1.  Moving to  a  larger 
party increases payoff if  outcome  pioned by a player, and the arrow indicates the 
does not change.  median policy championed. 
The two-stage electoral games that we study 
may  not  satisfy condition  E: when  a  candidate's position  changes,  voters' 
strategic incentives may change, causing a change in the voting equilibrium in 
the subgame which may affect the candidate's probability of  winning. 
In Figure 2, before the left candidate moves 
a  a  0 ,,,..  to the center to form a two-member party (top), 
citizens with favorite policies on the right have 
a  an incentive to vote for the right candidate, be- 
a  -  Q  cause were they to abstain the right candidate 
A 
I  would  not  be  elected  and the policy  outcome 
would be further to the left (as indicated by the 
Figure  2.  When a candidate's  arrow).  If  the left candidate moves to the mid- 
position changes, voters' strategic 
incentives may change.  dle (bottom), the outcome does not change  if 
- 
citizens vote as they did before,  However, after 
the left candidate moves the citizens no longer have an incentive to vote for 
the right candidate, because their switching to abstention has no effect on the 
policy. 
The following variant of condition E accommodates this problem and fits 
well  with  models in  which  the players  are elected.  It says  that there  are economies of  party size if a move to a larger party does not change the incen- 
tives to participate. 
PE (participation dependent economies of party size) If a participant's switch- 
ing to a larger party  (a) does not change the median championed policy 
and  (b)  would  not change the median championed policy  if  the action 
of any given other player  were to be  fied  at nonparticipation, then her 
pay08 increases. 
The left party's move to the center in the example in Figure 2 satisfies (a) 
but not (b) (because the move would change the outcome were the rightist not 
to participate). 
Condition PE is appropriate for a two-stage model in which each candidate 
is committed to the policy she champions.  However, in a model in which a 
legislator can renege on a commitment to champion a policy, we need a version 
of the condition that applies only if the legislators' incentives to maintain their 
positions remain unchanged. 
K  Consider Figure 3. A move to the left party  *  by a member (say i) of the center-left party sat-  *  * 
a Ti%?  ""lCi  isfies both (a) and (b) of PE. However, after 2's 
?  move, the remaining member of  the center-left 
0  party (say j) can, by changing her position, af- 
a  fect the median position in ways that she could  a* 
e  e  not originally  (assuming she remains  elected). 
rn  kw*k---A*t  v  Specifically, after  i's  move,  j's  moving to the 
left moves  the median to the left  (assuming j 
Figure  3.  Incentives  change  remains elected), whereas prior to 2's  move, no 
when a member of  the center-left  move  of  j  results in such a change in the me- 
party moves to the extreme left. 
dian.  Thus, depending on  j's  preferences,  i's 
move may give j an incentive to renege on j's commitment to champion the 
position of  the center-left  party.  Consequently,  i should  be  concerned  that 
her move to the left will precipitate an undesirable outcome-changing move to 
the left by her ex-comrade. This consideration leads us to study the following 
condition, which is weaker than PE. SE (strategy dependent economies of  party size) If  a participant's  switching 
to a larger party (a)  does not change the median championed policy and 
(b)  does not allow  any other player,  by changing her action, to  induce 
outcomes that she could  not induce  before  the participant's  move,  then 
her payof  increases. 
The move from the center-left party to the left party by player  i that we 
considered in Figure 3 does not satisfy (b) because after the move, the other 
member of  the center-left party can, by moving her position to the left, move 
the median championed policy to the left, a change she cannot induce before 
2's  move. 
Results 
A key  finding  is that if  participation is costly  (C) and the game has  par- 
ticipation dependent economies of  party size  (PE), then exactly two  parties 
form, and these parties  are of  equal  or almost equal size.  In addition, up 
to three "independents" participate.  If the game satisfies the stronger condi- 
tion of  economies of  party size (E), then at most two  "independents" partici- 
pate. When participation is costly (C) and the game has strategy dependent 
economies of  party size (SE),  then exactly two  parties with more than two 
members form, and these parties are of  equal or  almost equal size.  In addi- 
tion, up to three small parties or independents participate (see Figure 4). 
Our two-party result is very general.  It does not depend on the magnitude 
of  the economies of  party size or sensitively on the nature of  the individu- 
als' payoffs beyond conditions C and E, PE, or SE. Thus the results in our 
applications do not depend sensitively on the nature of  the individuals' pref- 
erences over  policies;  for example, we  do not  assume these preferences  are 
single-peaked. 
The idea behind the result is straightforward. In deciding whether to par- 
ticipate in a party or to champion a position as an individual, a player po- 
tentially faces a tradeoff.  Joining a party saves her some cost, but may force 
her to compromise her position. However, if the policy outcome is the median .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.. 
Odd number of participants  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  0..  . 
~i-~-~w*  r' m  * 
Even number of  participants 
The types of  equilibria of  a game satisfying C and E (Proposition 4.1)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . .  0..  .  .  ... 
-=MA(' 
The additional types of  equilibria of a game satisfying C and PE (Proposition 4.2)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . .  .  0..  . . .  . . .  .  0..  .  0.. 
*%c**%&l*&  - 
The additional types of  equilibria of  a game satisfying C and SE (Proposition 4.3) 
Figure 4. The equilibria of a game satisfying C and E, PE, or SE. Agglomerations of  four 
or more players are parties, which may  contain any number of  players. 
of the legislators' proposed policies, then joining a party whose position is on 
the same side of  the median as is her favorite position is just  as effective in 
determining the outcome as is championing her own favorite position.  Thus 
in fact the individual faces no tradeoff.  A left-leaning legislator is better off 
joining  a left-leaning party than acting as an independent, regardless of  the 
size of  the cost saving, and a right-leaning  legislator  is  better off  joining  a 
right-leaning party Relation with literature 
The applications of  our model to committee voting and the electoral process 
in a representative democracy are related to models in the literature. 
Both our model of  committee voting and Feddersen's  (1992) voting model 
seek to explain two-party competition. The models differ in their explanatory 
variables.  Feddersen's model emphasizes the role of voting decisions, while our 
model emphasizes the role of  legislators. Feddersen assumes that the outcome 
is the policy that obtains the most votes,  an assumption that captures well 
a single-district  plurality rule election.  By contrast, the median rule in our 
model is an appropriate model of legislative compromise. 
Feddersen's first-past-the-post  outcome function leads immediately to the 
conclusion that parties form in equilibrium.  (Only a party can win  an elec- 
tion,) His two-party result hinges also on this outcome function; it depends in 
addition on an assumption about the distribution of  voters'  preferences (see 
his Proposition 4).  In our model, by  contrast, party-formation  is driven by 
our assumption of  economies of  party size.  Furthermore, our two-party result 
does not depend on any assumption about the nature of  preferences. 
Gerber  and Ortufio-Ortin  (1998) study a  model related  to Feddersen's, 
with a continuum of  voters.  They assume a continuous outcome function that 
weights parties by  their sizes and gives proportionally larger weight to large 
parties.  (Such a function is not consistent  with a winner-takes-all  electoral 
rule.)  They show that a unique strong Nash equilibrium exists, in which there 
are two parties. 
The model of  Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner  (2000) is related  to our 
example of  committee decision-making  with costly participation.  The key 
respect in which their model differs from our application to committee voting 
lies in their assumption that each player's participation cost is independent of 
the other participants' actions. Under this assumption, a player's strategy of 
proposing her favorite policy weakly  dominates her other strategies, so that 
there is no cost-based  incentive for individuals with different preferences to 
form parties. In the equilibria of their model, moderates do not participate and 
participation in large populations is low.  The equilibria of  our model, where the participation cost  declines  with the number  of  individuals proposing  a 
given policy, do not necessarily have these characteristics.  In particular, while 
equilibria may exist  in which some moderates do not participate, there also 
exist equilibria in which all individuals participate, even in large populations. 
Further, in equilibrium two parties form. 
Several other models generate parties from principles different from those 
that drive the application of our model to the electoral process.  Morelli (2001), 
for example, studies a model of party formation as an extensive game in which 
two potential candidates with extreme preferences propose compromise posi- 
tions to a moderate potential candidate; subsequently each potential candidate 
chooses whether to stand, an election is held, and the outcome is the median of 
the elected politicians' positions. He finds that the number of parties depends 
on the electoral system and the distribution of  preferences.  The primary role 
of  parties in his model is that they coordinate citizens' votes in an election. 
Baron  (1993) studies a  model of  proportional  representation  within  the 
Hotelling-Downs  framework.  Citizens are not  strategic, party formation is 
not costly, and the number of parties is fixed.  Party size is determined by the 
fact that a large party has a diverse, and thus harder to please, membership, 
whereas such a party is more likely to be part of the government and be able 
to implement a policy appealing to its members. 
Duverger (1954, Book 11, Ch. I) argues that the evidence suggests that "the 
simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system"  (p. 217), 
while  "the simple-majority system with second ballot  and proportional rep- 
resentation favour multi-partism"  (p. 239).  (This claim is sometimes called 
"Duverger's law" .)  The first part of  the claim is given theoretical support by 
Cox  (1987) and Palfrey  (1989) in  a model in which  strategic voters  elect  a 
single representative.  They formalize the idea that votes for candidates with 
little chance of  winning are wasted, resulting in equilibria in which there are 
two candidates,  Feddersen's model, discussed above, also lends the first part 
of  the claim theoretical support, as do the "citizen-candidate"  models of  Os- 
borne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Our result provides 
an alternative strong rationale for  the emergence  of  two parties under  ma- jority  rule; it further suggests that when there is a single issue, two parties 
also emerge under proportional representation, contrary to the second part of 
Duverger's claim. 
2.  Model 
Each member of  a group I = {1,2,. .  .  ,  n}  of  n people chooses whether to 
champion a policy, and if so, which one. A policy is a member of  the nonempty 
set X; the action of non-participation is denoted 0.  A person who champions 
a policy is called a participant.  Each person i's  payoff  function is ui: (X  U 
{el).  -+ a. 
If  two or more people champion the same policy x E X,  we  say that x is 
a party; if  a single person champions x, we  say that x is an independent. We 
call a party with more than two members a large party and one with exactly 
two members a small party. 
The policy  outcome is a compromise among the policies championed by 
participants: a compromise function M : (X  U  -+  X assigns to each ac- 
tion profile an outcome, with M(0, .  . .  ,B) (the outcome if no one participates) 
equal to some given  default policy.  We  discuss the compromise function in 
Section 3. 
In summary, we  study a strategic game in which the set of  players is I = 
{I,  .  .  . ,  n},  the set of  actions of each player is XU  (01, and the payoff function 
of  each player  i is ui  : (X  U (0))"  -+  R  The relation between  the actions 
and payoffs depends on the compromise function M, and we  denote the game 
I? (I,  (X  u {f?))iEI,  (u~)~~~  ,  M)  ;  when there is no possibility for confusion we  use 
the abbreviation I'(M). 
We  say that participation in the game r(M) is costly if  a player prefers 
to withdraw if  her withdrawal does not change the outcome.  This condition 
captures the idea that participation is costly. 
Definition 2.1. For a strategy profile a E (X  u (0))"  the game r(M)  has 
C  costly  participation  at a  if  ui(B,  > ui(a) whenever  ai  E  X  and 
M (a) = M (0,  for any player  i. We  say that a game that has costly participation for every action profile has 
costly participation. 
Our assumptions about economies of party size are explained in the Frame- 
worlc section of the Introduction. Here, and subsequently, we  use #Z to denote 
the number of  members of  the set 2. 
Definition 2.2. For a strategy profile a E (X  U {B))n the game r(M)  has 
E  economies  of  party  size  at  a  if  u~(x,  a-,)  > u,(a) whenever  ai  E  X, 
M(a)  = M(x,  a_,),  and #{j E I :  aj = a,) < #{j E I : aj =  X) 
PE participation  dependent economies of party  size at  a if  ui(x,  > ui(a) 
whenever ai  E X,  M(a)  = M(x,  a-i), M(6,  a-h)  = M(6,  (x,  a+,)-h) for 
each player h, and #{j E I : a:, = ai) L. #{j E I :  aj = a) 
SE  strategy  dependent  economies  of party  size  at a if  ~~(x,a-~)  > u2(a) 
whenever  ai  E  X, M(a) = M(x,  a-i), for any participating player  h 
and any y  E X  U (6) there exists z E X  U (6)  such that M(z,  = 
M(g,  (x,  a-%)-h),  and #{j E I : aj =  ai) 5 #{j E I : a, =  x). 
We  say that a game that satisfies E for every action profile  has  economies 
of  party  size, one that satisfies PE for every action profile has partzcipation 
dependent economies of party  size, and one that satisfies SE for every action 
profile has strategy  dependent  economies of  party  size. 
Examples 
Example  2.1  (Committee voting). Each  member  of  a committee of  n 
people chooses whether to champion a policy in X  or not to participate.  Each 
person  i obtains the payoff  v,(x) from the policy x, where  v, : X  --+  R; we 
refer to vi as i7s  valuation function. If person i participates and chooses x she 
bears the cost ci(k(x)),  where k(x)  is the number of  people proposing x and 
c; : N  -+  R is positive and decreasing. 
We may model this situation as a game in which the set of  players is the 
set of  n people, the set of actions of  each player is X  U {6), and player i's payoff function is given by 
This payoff function satisfies conditions C and E at every action profile:  par- 
ticipation is costly and the game has economies of party size. 
This example may be generalized so that each person's cost of championing 
a  policy  depend  on  the policies championed  by  others,  not  simply on  the 
number of others championing it, which captures the idea that arguing the case 
for a policy may be more difficult if it is extreme, or if some other particularly 
attractive position is being championed.  The resulting game also satisfies C 
and E. 
Example 2.2  (Elections without  commitment). Consider  a  two-stage 
game in which the players consist  of  both citizens and candidates for a leg- 
islature.  In the first stage each citizen votes for a candidate; these decisions 
are made simultaneously. The set of  winners of the election is determined by 
an arbitrary rule.  (For example, the set of  winners may consist of  the top k 
vote-getters,  with ties broken randomly.)  In the second  stage, each legisla- 
tor chooses whether to actively participate, incurring an effort cost, and if so 
which  policy to champion,  (A politician cannot commit to a policy prior to 
the election.) We assume that the effort cost displays economies of party size. 
As before, the policy outcome is the median of the policies championed by the 
legislators.  Both and citizens and politicians care about this policy outcome. 
(In particular, the politicians are "ideological" ,) 
More precisely, the players in the subgame following any first-period history 
are the elected legislators, and  the subgame  has the form  of  the game in 
Example 2.1.  Thus each subgame satisfies C and E.  Implicit in the game is 
the assumption that the electorate knows the preferences of each politician and 
thus can anticipate the behavior of  the elected legislators in each subgame. 
Proposition 4.2 below implies that in every subgame the politicians form 
two parties.  (Thus under plurality rule with ties broken randomly, every real- ization of  the legislature contains two parties.) 
Example 2.3 (Elections with commitment). We  now consider a model 
that allows a richer interaction between voters and candidates, and permits 
candidates who are not ideological. 
The electoral process has two stages. 
First, each potential legislator chooses whether  to become a candidate, 
and if  so the policy she commits to champion. 
Second, each citizen chooses whether to vote for a candidate, and if  so, 
which one. 
An electoral rule determines the members of the legislature,  The policy 
outcome is the median of  the policies championed by the elected candidates. 
Each citizen cares about the policy outcome and incurs a fixed cost if  she 
votes.  Each potential legislator incurs a cost if she participates as a candidate 
and may or may not care about the policy outcome.  If  elected she obtains a 
"prize" that compensates her for the costs; this prize depends on the number 
of elected legislators who propose the same policy (i.e. on the size of her party 
after the election.) This prize could reflect the fact that the cost of  running is 
lower for a member of  a larger party or public subsidies to parties. 
We study this game in detail in Section 6. Fix a subgame perfect equilib- 
rium and consider the strategic game in which the players are the potential 
legislators and the payoff  of  each legislator to the action profile a of  policy 
commitments is  her  equilibrium in the subgame following a.  We  show in 
Proposition 6.1 that this strategic game satisfies C  (costly participation) and 
PE (participation dependent economies of  party size) under a natural refine- 
ment of subgame perfection that we  call subgame persistence. 
We  consider  a  modification of  the game in  which  any elected  legislator 
may  change  her  position  after  the election-i.e.  may  renege  on  her  policy 
commitment.  We  propose  an  alterative  refinement  of  subgame perfection, 
which  takes  into account  incentive compatibility requirements in  subgames, 
and show that the associated strategic game between the potential legislators 
satisfies C and SE (Proposition 6.3). Example 2.4 (Proportional representation with party lists). The pre- 
vious example can be specialized to  proportional representation based on party 
lists (the electoral system in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Nether- 
lands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). Candidates proposing the same po- 
sition are ordered into a party-list and each citizen votes for one of  these lists. 
Each list is  awarded a  number of  seats in proportion to the votes received. 
Each action profile in the two-stage game of the previous example corresponds 
to an action profile in this party-list  model, with the same payoffs, and vice 
versa.  Thus the results for the previous example apply also to this example. 
3.  The compromise 
We  assume that the set X of  policies is  "completely ordered".  That is, the 
members of  X are related by an ordering, denoted  <,6  which we  interpret as 
embodying the policies' positions on a left-right  political spectrum.  That is, 
if  x < y then all players agree that x is more left than y, and if  x < y then 
they agree that x is at least as left as y.  The members of X may be numbers, 
in which case < may take its usual meaning, but they may alternatively be 
points in a higher-dimensional space, as long as they may be ordered. 
We assume that the compromise is the median of the policies championed 
by participants.  The median is the middle proposed policy if  the number of 
participants is odd, a policy between the two middle positions if  the number 
of participants is positive and even, and a default outcome d E X  if  no player 
participates.  Precisely, order the participants  (the players whose actions are 
in X) so that a1 < .  .  *  < arc  If k  is odd, the median of a is m(a) = a(k+l)lz 
If k  is positive and even, the left median of  a is m6(a)  =  and the right 
median of  a is mr  (a) =  ak/2+l, and we assume that the compromise is M(a) = 
S(ml(a),  mr(a)),  where S : X x X  --+  X with S(x,  y) = S(y,  x) if  x E X and 
y E  X, and x 5 S(x,  y) < y if x < y. 
"hat  is, 5 is transitive, complete (either x < y or y 5 x for any two policies x E X and 
y E X),  reflexive (x 5 s),  and antisymmetric (x 5 y and y < x, implies x =  y). In summary, for any action profile a the outcome is 
if a = (8,.  . .  ,8) 
if #{i  E I : ai  E X) is odd 
S(ml(a),  mT  (a))  if #{i  E I : ai E X) is positive and even. 
The median  championed policy is not beaten by  any policy in pairwise 
voting when  each  participant's  preferences are single-peaked  (relative to the 
ordering) with a peak at the policy she champions. The understanding under- 
lying this outcome function is that a player's championing a policy entails her 
committing to vote according to some single-peaked  preference that peaks at 
that policy. 
4.  Properties of equilibrium 
We study the properties of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of  a game sat- 
isfying our conditions.  The following result is illustrated in Figure 4 (page 7). 
Proposition 4.1. At any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive 
and C  and E  are satisfied, one of the following  conditions holds. 
a.  The  number of participants is odd and there is either a single independent 
or two equal-sized parties  between which there is an independent. 
b,  The number of  participants  is even,  and  there  are  (i) two  equal-sized 
parties  and no independents, (ii) two independents, (iii) two equal-sized 
parties  between which there are  two independents,  or (iv) two parties, 
one larger by one member than the other, between which there is a single 
independent. 
This result and all subsequent ones are proved in the appendix. The proof 
rests on two main ideas. First, if there are two parties on one side of  the me- 
dian, then any member of the smaller party (or of either party, if  the sizes are 
the same) can switch to the other party without affecting the outcome.  Such 
a move is profitable by condition E. Second, if a single position is proposed and more than one player proposes it, then no player's  withdrawal affects the 
outcome. Therefore, by condition C some participating player can profitably 
withdraw. 
When the weaker condition PE  is satisfied three further types of equilibria 
may occur (again, see Figure 4). 
Proposition 4.2. Any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive and 
C and PB are satisfied either takes one of the forms  given in Proposition 4.1 
or has an odd number of participants and (i) three independents, (ii) two equal- 
sized parties  and three independents holding positions  between the parties,  or 
(iii) two parties,  one larger  by  one member,  and  two independents holding 
positions  between the parties. 
Under the even weaker condition SE we  get only an additional three new 
types of  equilibria. 
Proposition 4.3. Any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive and 
C and SE  are satisfied  either takes one of the forms  given in Proposition 4.2 
or has an even number of participants  and  (i) two large parties  of equal size 
and two small parties holding positions between the large parties,  (ii) two large 
parties,  one larger than the other by two members, and one small party holding 
a position between the large parties,  or (iii) two Earge  parties,  one larger than 
the other by one member, and a small party  and an independent holding posi- 
tions between the Earge  parties  with the independent holding a position closer 
to the largest party. 
5.  Equilibrium of committee voting 
The game of committee voting in Example 2.1 satisfies C and E,  so by Propo- 
sition 4.1 any Nash equilibrium has one of  the forms shown in Figure 4.  We 
now  fully  characterize the equilibria in  which  there are two  parties and no 
independents, which we refer to here as two-party equilibria. Notice that if the 
cost of being the sole proponent of  a position is too high to justify any possible 
benefit, then every equilibrium with positive participation is of  this type. We  use the following assumption. 
A  The policy  space X  is a  non-trivial  interval of  the real line  IW,  The 
valuation function of each player i is given by v,  (s)  =  v (lx -  zit),  where 
v : R -+ R is strictly concave, each player's  cost function c,  is the same, 
equal to e, and S(s,y)  = $(z+  y) for all s € X and y E X. 
Under this assumption, for any two-party equilibrium in which each party 
has k  members and the distance between  the parties7 positions is z  we  find 
a number r, which  depends on  k and z  (and may be positive or negative), 
such that all players whose favorite positions are to the left of  x -  T belong 
to the left party, the favorite position of  every member of  the left party is to 
the left of i(x  + y) -  r,  all players  whose favorite positions are to the right 
of  y +  r  belong to the right party, and the favorite position of  every member 
of  the right party is to the right of ;(a +  y) + r. Further, every action profile 
that satisfies these conditions is an equilibrium. In particular, the result gives 
conditions under which  a two-party  equilibrium with parties of  a given size 
and separation exists.  It is illustrated in Figure 6. 
We  can state the result precisely  with the aid of  a function t  defined as 
follows. For any z > 0 define 
- 
C(z)  = max [v(t) -  v(t + tz)] 
t 
(which may be infinite). Now, for any C with 0 < C < c(z)  there is a unique 
point t(z,  C) such that v(t(z,  C)) -  v(t(z, C) + $2) = C  (refer to Figure 5). 
Note that t(z,  0) = --iz  for all z > 0, and t is decreasing in z for any given 
value of  C and increasing in C for any given value of  z. 
Proposition 5.1.  Assume A. The action profile a  is a two-party Nash equi- 
librium if and only if  every player  either belongs to one of  two parties, x  and 
y > x, or does not participate,  the parties  have the same number k > 2  of Figure 5. Two examples of the determination of  t(z,  C). 
members, c(k) 5 ??(y  -  x), and 
The proof of  this result involves finding players who are indifferent between 
belonging to one of  the parties or withdrawing,  It then uses the concavity of 
the valuation function to conclude that all players with more extreme, or less 
extreme, favorite positions prefer one action or the other. 
6.  Elections with commitment 
In Example 2.3, each of  a finite number n of  potential legislators has the op- 
portunity to vie for a place in a legislative assembly. Candidates are elected to 
the assembly by a population of  citizens, modelled as a finite positive atomless 
measure space (0,  F,  p).  (We adopt this formulation to avoid integer prob- 
lems.)  The electoral process has two  stages.  First, each potential legislator 
chooses whether to become a candidate, and if  so which policy (member of X) 
to champion.  Second, each citizen chooses whether to vote for a candidate, 
and if  so, which one. 
In the subgame following the potential legislators' action profile a E (X  U party x 
An example with 7 > 0 
party x  P= ~(x+Y)  party Y 
An example with 7 < 0 
Figure 6. The equilibria under assumption A (Proposition 5.1).  The parties' positions are 
x and y, ,u  = :(a:  +  y), and T =  t(y -  x,c(k)), where k is the size of  each party. 
{8})n,  a voting profile for the citizens is a measurable function 
where ba(w) = 8 means that citizen w does not vote and ba(w) = i means she 
votes for candidate i E I (who proposes the policy ai E X). 
Electoral rule  An electoral rule translates the voting profile into a subset of 
the candidates (those who are elected). We work here with rules that elect a 
potential legislator if  and only if  the number of  votes she obtains is at least 
equal to some  LLquota7'  of  votes.  This quota is  given  by  a  quota  function 
Q:  IW?  -+ 1Wt, that is continuous, nondecreasing (x L. y implies Q(x) > Q(y)), 
anon,ymous in  the sense  that for  any  one-to-one  function  X  : I -+  I we have Q(al,  . . . , a,)  = Q(ql)  , . . .  ,  Q~(~)),  and vanishes, if  at all, only at zero 
(Q(x) = 0 implies x = 0).  Given a profile a of  policies championed by the 
potential legislators and a voting profile ba, (ba)-l(j) is the set of citizens who 
vote for candidate j and p((ba)-'(j))  is the size of  this set.  Thus legislator i 
is elected if 
The following three examples of  quota functions are continuous,  nonde- 
creasing, and anonymous.  A potential legislator is elected if  and only if  she 
gets at least as many votes as 
i.  (first-past-the-post) every other candidate: Q(a1,  .  . . ,  a,)  -- maxi~.r  ai 
ii.  (Hare Quota) the total number  of  votes divided by z,  the number  of 
seats in the legislature: Q(a1,.  . . ,  a,)  = (x:=,  ai) /r 
iii.  (fixed quota) a fixed number  (which might be related to the size of  the 
population): Q(a) =  6 for all a E Rn. 
Payofis  The policy championed by legislator i is 
ai  if  i is elected 
Ai (a,  ba) = 
8  otherwise. 
Each  citizen  w  E  S2  attaches the value v(w,x) to the policy  x  E  X, where 
v :  S2 x X -+  R  We refer to v(w, .)  as w's valuation function.  We assume that 
the function v (., x) is integrable for any x. 
A  citizen who votes  incurs the cost C, > 0.  The payoff  u(w, (a, ba)) of 
* 
citizen w depends on the outcome and whether she votes: 
V(W, M(A(a,  ba))) -  C,  if ba(w) # 6' 
~(~1  M(A(a7 ba)))  if  ba (w) =  0 . Each potential legislator i incurs the cost Cl > 0 if  she participates as a 
candidate and has a valuation function  vi  : X -+ R  over policies,  If  elected 
she obtains a  "prize"  that depends on the number of  elected legislators that 
propose the same policy (i.e. on the size of her party after the election). Specif- 
ically, the payoff of potential legislator i is 
vi (M(A(a,  ba)))  if  ai =  8 
vi(M  (A(a,  ba))) -  Ce  if ad  # 0  & i not elected 
vi(M(A(a,ba)))  -Ct+P,(a,ba)  ifa, #0  &i  is elected, 
where 
Pi(a,  ba) =  p (#{j  E I :  Aj(a,  ba) =  ail) 
and p : N  -+ I&++ is a positive increasing function, called the prize function. 
Equilibrium  Given the continuum of voters, no single voter affects the out- 
come of  the election.  To obtain meaningful equilibria, we  consider strategy 
profiles from which no arbitrarily small group of citizens has an incentive to 
deviate. 
Each action profile a  E  (X U (0))"  of  the potential legislators leads to a 
subgame ra  in which the citizens vote.  Given a voting profile b in the subgame 
Fa and  E  > 0, we  say that a measurable set S C R is an &-club  if  S C  bb'(j) 
for some j E {i E I :  at  E X) U (0)  (either all members of  S vote for the same 
candidate, or none votes) and 0 < p(S) <  E. 
Definition 6.1. The voting profile b in the subgame Pa  is a small clubs Nash 
equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) of  the subgame if  there exists E  > 0 
such that for every E-club S C  S1  and every j E (i E I : ai E X) U (0) 
Notice that when R is finite and p is the counting measure, the notion of 
a small clubs Nash  equilibrium coincides with the notion of  a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile in the whole game is a pair (a,  B) where a E (X  U {O))n 
and B is a function that associates each a* E (XU  {O))n  with a voting profile 
B(a*)  : R +  (i E I :  af E X) U (0)  in the subgame ra*  .7  For a strategy profile 
(a,  B) we say that there is positive voter turnout if B(a)  does not vanish almost 
everywhere. 
For each strategy profile B of the citizens define the strategic game for the 
legislators 
cB  (1,  (X U (O))itJ,  (wi)JtJ,  M) 
by letting wi(a) = ui(a,  B(a)) for each a E (X U  and each i, where u, is 
the payoff of  the potential legislator. 
Each voting subgame Fa may have multiple equilibria, with a variety of 
outcomes. We restrict attention to equilibria of  the whole game in which each 
legislator expects a deviation in the first stage to have no effect on the citizens' 
voting behavior if  this behavior remains an equilibrium of  the subgame reached 
after the deviation. We say that the subgames ra*  and ra  are adjacent if  there 
exists some player i and some z E X U (0)  such that a* = (x,  a_,) (i.e. the 
histories a and a* differ only in the action of  a single candidate). 
Definition  6.2.  A  strategy profile  (a,B)  is an equilibrium  if a  is a Nash 
equilibrium of  the game GB  and the voting profile B(a) is a small clubs Nash 
equilibrium of  the subgame following the history a.  An equilibrium strategy 
profile (a,  B) is a subgame persistent equilibrium if  for every a* adjacent to a 
we  have B (a*) = B  (a) whenever B (a) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of  the 
subgame following a*. 
Results 
Proposition 6.1. If  (a,  B) is a subgame persistent  equilibrium with positive  . 
voter turnout, then the game GB satisfies C and PE at a. 
The next result is an immediate consequence of  Propositions 4.2 and 6.1. 
A 
7We use the notation B(a*)  instead of  ba* to emphasize the fixed strategy profile B for 
the second stage of  the game. Corollary 6.2.  In a subgame persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout 
all participating  candidates are  elected  and  their positions  are configured  ac- 
cording to Proposition 4.2. 
To see the logic behind the result, note first that at equilibrium, the con- 
tinuity of the quota function and the fact that it is nondecreasing imply that 
all elected candidates get exactly the quota of  votes and candidates that are 
not  elected  get no  votes.  Therefore, by  subgame persistence  any unelected 
candidate can profitably drop out without  affecting the policy  outcome, so 
that all candidates at equilibrium get elected.  To show that condition C is 
satisfied at a, we  note that if  withdrawal does not change the outcome, a small 
club of  citizens voting for that candidate can profitably drop out.  To  show 
that condition PE is satisfied at a, we  argue that if a move by  candidate i 
to a larger party x satisfies the conditions of PE, then the equilibrium voting 
profile of  the subgame following the history a is also an equilibrium voting 
profile of  the adjacent subgame following the history  (x,  a+$).  The reason is 
that if the members of  a small club of voters find it profitable to deviate in the 
adjacent subgame, then they also find it profitable to deviate in the original 
subgame, contradicting equilibrium.  So by subgame persistence candidate i 
finds it profitable to move to the larger party x. 
Incentive  compatibility  We  now study the implications of  allowing the can- 
didates to renege on  their policy commitments.  1Ve  look at equilibria that 
satisfy two conditions.  First, no elected legislator can profitably change her 
policy after she has incurred the cost of participation and obtained the "prize" 
that depends on the size of her party. Second, each potential legislator expects 
a deviation in the first stage to have no effect on the citizens' voting behavior 
if  this behavior remains an equilibrium of  the subgame reached  after the de- 
viation  and  no elected legislator wishes to renege on her policy commitment 
in this subgame. By weakening  the restriction on deviants' beliefs about the 
resulting voting equilibrium, we  potentially allow beliefs for which deviations 
that were profitable under subgame persistence are no longer profitable, and 
thus expand the set of  equilibria. Let  b be a voting profile for citizens in the subgame following a. We say 
that (a,  b)  is incentive compatible if for any policy x E X and for any elected 
legislator i in that subgame we  have 
where vi is 2's  valuation function. That is, a voting profile is incentive compat- 
ible for a given strategy profile for potential legislators if no elected legislator 
can profitably change her policy after the election. 
Definition 6.3. An equilibrium strategy profile (a,  B) is a subgame IC-persistent 
equilibrium if  (a,  B(a))  is incentive compatible and for every a*  adjacent to a 
we have B(a*) =  B(a) whenever B(a) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of  the 
subgame following a* and (a*,  B(a))  is incentive compatible. 
A subgame persistent equilibrium (a, B) may not be a subgame IC-persistent 
equilibrium, because (a, B(a))  may not be incentive compatible. However, 
(a,  B) is subgame persistent and  +  (a,  B) is subgame IC-persistent . 
(a,  B(a)) is incentive compatible 
Further, a subgame IC-persistent  equilibrium (a,  B) may not be a subgame 
persistent equilibrium, because at a* adjacent to a we may have B(a*)  # B(a) 
even though B(a) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of the subgame following 
a* (i'e. a voting profile may remain an equilibrium for  an adjacent subgame 
but may no longer be incentive compatible.) 
The next result follows easily from the proof of Proposition 6.1. 
Proposition 6.3.  If  (a,  B) is a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium with posi- 
tive voter turnout, then the game GB satisfies C and  SE at a. 
Corollary  6.4.  In  a subgame  IC-persistent  equilibrium with positive  voter 
turnout, all participating  candidates get  elected  and  their positions  are  config- 
ured  according to Proposition 4.3. The Hare Quota  Consider briefly the specific election rule given by the Hare 
Quota, whereby a potential legislator is elected if  and only if the number of 
votes she obtains is at least the total number of votes divided by E, the number 
of seats in the legislature. 
In this case, if candidates are not ideological then the conclusion of Propo- 
sition 6.1 holds for subgame perfect  equilibria.  This result  follows from the 
fact that for the Hare Quota, in any equilibrium of  a  voting subgame with 
positive voter turnout exactly  legislators are elected, each receiving exactly 
the Hare Quota of  votes. 
Another implication of this property is that the Hare Quota can be con- 
sidered in the class of  the Single Transferable Vote  (STV) pr~cedures.~  At 
an equilibrium of  our model each elected legislator receives exactly the Hare 
Quota of  votes.  Therefore, this procedure provides transferability implicitly- 
if a  candidate has enough  votes to get  elected, then  in equilibrium  excess 
supporters allocate their votes to other candidates or drop out,Q 
Existence  of equilibrium  A subgame persistent  equilibrium of  the two-stage 
game exists under weak  conditions.  If  we  assume, for example, that poten- 
tial legislators are not ideological, citizens' preferences are single-peaked, and 
the distribution of  favorite positions is nonatomic, then we  can construct an 
equilibrium.  For a  small enough  cost  of  participation,  we  find a two-party 
equilibrium in which all citizens vote, citizens whose favorite positions are to 
the left  of  the population  median vote for the left party,  and those whose 
positions are to the right of  the population vote for the right party. 
81n the canonical STV procedure if  a candidate receives more than the quota of  votes, 
then the excess votes are transferred to another candidate, usually using the voters' sec- 
ondary preferences. 
gFor a history of  the STV procedure  see Tideman (1995) and Richardson and Tide- 
man (2000). One of  the earliest versions of  STV voting was in a local election in Tasmania, 
Australia.  In that election a voter recorded his  name on his preferred candidate's list.  A 
candidate secured election by  receiving the required number of  votes,  As  in our model, 
Richardson and Tideman point out that this procedure provides transferability implicitly, 
in that when a candidate had enough votes to be elected, supporters see this and allocate 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof  of  Proposition Proposition 4.3  (SE).  Let a be a Nash equilibrium with 
at least two participants. 
Number of participants is even:  Ignore nonparticipating players and re- 
index the participants from -k  to -1  and from 1 to k so that a, (  aj  if i (  j, 
so that the left median is aUl and the right median is al. In this proof we  use 
a(~\i)  to denote the list of  actions of  the players other than i and a-i  to denote 
the action of  player  -2. 
We prove the result by establishing four properties of an equilibrium.  (By 
the symmetry  of  the situation we  need  only  look  at players  with  positive 
indexes.) 
(i) a1  # aAl: If al =  aFl and either player 1  or player -1  withdraws then the 
outcome does not change, so by C the player's withdrawal is profitable, which 
is inconsistent with equilibrium. 
(ii) If  i 2  3  and  j  2 3,  then ai = aj: Suppose by way of contradiction that 
ai # aj. Without loss of  generality, assume that aj  is held by at least as many 
players  as is ai.  If  player  i moves  to aj, then the policy outcome does not 
change and she joins a larger party.  (1.e. the second and fourth conditions in 
SE are satisfied for x =  aJ.) 
Now take a participating player h. If we fix that player's action at nonpar- 
ticipation, the new outcome becomes al or a-l  irrespective of  player i's move 
to the position  of j.  Further, if  we  fix player  h's  action to y  E  X  then the 
new outcome is the same before and after i moves to aj, because the positions 
of  player 2 and all players to the left of  her remain unchanged with i's  move. 
That is, M(y, (aj,  u(~\~))(~\~))  = M(Y,  u(~\~)).  Thus by SE, player 2's  move to 
a,  is profitable, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. (iii) Players 2  is not an independent:  Suppose by way  of  contradiction that 
player 2 is an independent. Then by  (i) player 1  is also an independent.  Now 
if  2 shifts her position to 1, then she joins  a two member party and does not 
change the outcome.  Take some participating player h and fix her position to 
y E  Notice that when M(Y,  a(l\h))  # M(y,  (a17 a(I\!J))(l\h)),  we  have 
M(y, (al,  a(1\2))(1\h))  = al. Therefore, letting z = a1 we  have M(x,  = 
M(y,  (al,  u(I\~))(~\~)),  SO that by  SE player 2's move to al is profitable, which 
is inconsistent with equilibrium. 
(iv) Ifa2 # a3 then player 3 is a member of  a party with three or more members: 
Suppose that a2 # a3 and that a3 is held by two members or an independent. 
By (iii), players 1  and 2 are members of  one party.  Now by the same argument 
as for (ii), the conditions of  SE are satisfied for i = 3 and x -  az, so that a 
move by player 3 to a2 is profitable, which is inconsisent with equilibrium. 
Number of participants is odd:  Re-index the participants from -k to k 
with ai <_ aj  if i <_ j, so that the median position is ao. 
(i) Player 0  is an independent:  If not, the withdrawal of  any player  whose 
position  is a.  does not  change  the outcome, so that by  C it is profitable, 
which is inconsistent with with equilibrium. 
(ii) If  i > 2 and j > 2,  then ai = aj: Suppose by way  of contradiction that 
ai # aj. Without loss of  generality, assume that aj  is held by at least as many 
players as is ai.  If  player  i moves  to aj then the policy outcome does not 
change and she joins a larger party.  (1.e. the second and fourth conditions in 
SE are satisfied for x =  aj.)  Now  take some participating player h and fix her 
position to x E X U (8). Then M (x,  (ai,  u(~\~))(~\~))  =  M(x, yI\q),  SO by SE 
the move to aj is profitable, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. 
(iii) If i 2 2, then i is not an independent:  If  i is an independent, then by  (i) 
player 1  is an independent and by  the same argument as in (ii) player i can 
profitably move to al.  C1 
Proof  of  Proposition 4.2 (Pi@).  Let a be a Nash equilibrium. PE  implies SE, 
so we  need  only  exclude  as  an  equilibrium an action profile with  an even number of  participants in which a two member party holds the right median 
position and there is a three or more member party to its right. 
Once again re-index the participants from --k to k, excluding 0, with ai 5 
aj  if i 5 j. Reconsider case (iv) of  the proof of  Proposition 4.3. 
(iv') Players 2  and 3  cannot hold  dzflerent positions:  If a2 # a3  and player 2 
moves to a3  then she joins  a larger party and does not change the outcome. 
Fixing the action of  some  player  h  to be nonparticipation, we  know  that 
M(0,  a(qh))  is al if  h < 0 and a-1  if h > 0.  Therefore M(0, (a3,  = 
M(0,  u(~\~)),  SO  that PE implies that player  2's  move to a3 is profitable.  0 
Proof  of  Proposition 4.1 (E). Let a be a  Nash  equilibrium.  E implies PE, 
which implies SE,  so we  need only exclude as an equilibrium an action profile 
with an odd number of participants in which an independent holds a position 
other than the median.  Such an action profile is excluded as an equilibrium 
because the median position is held by an independent in any equilibrium with 
an odd number of  participants, so that any other independent can profitably 
move to the median, given E.  0 
Proof  of  Proposition 5.1.  First suppose that the parties' positions and players' 
actions satisfy the conditions in the result. 
Consider  deviations by a player  i for whom x, < ,LL -  t(y -  z, c(k)) who 
supports party x.  If  she becomes  an independent, the outcome either does 
not change or moves away from her favorite position, and her  cost does not 
decrease; thus she is no better off. If she either withdraws or switches to party y 
the outcome changes from ,u  to y.  By the definition of  t(y -  x, c(k)) and the 
concavity of u, neither deviation increases her payoff.  Similarly a player i for 
whom xi 2  p. +  t(y -  x,  c(k)) does not increase her payoff by deviating from 
supporting party y. 
Now  consider a player i for whom x -  t(y -  x, c(k)) < xi < p who does 
not participate.  If  she deviates to supporting party x the outcome changes 
from p to x; by the definition of  t(y -  x,  c(k))  her payoff  does not increase, 
Given that the c(1) 2  c(k), the same argument implies that she is not better 
off becoming an independent at any position.  Similarly a player  i for whom fi < xi 5 y + t(y -  x,  ~(k))  who does not participate does not increase her 
payoff by deviating to support party y or becoming an independent. 
We  conclude that every action profile that satisfies the conditions in the 
result is a Nash equilibrium. 
Now consider a two-party Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 4.1, the parties 
have the same number of  members, say k. Denote the parties' positions by x 
and y > x.  If  c(k)  > c(y  -  x)  then every member of  each party is better off 
withdrawing, which moves the outcome from ?(x +  y) to the position of  the 
other party. Thus c(k)  5 c(y  -  x). 
Now consider a player  i for whom xi < p +  t(y -  x,  e(k)).  If she supports 
party y then by withdrawing she changes the outcome from ,LL  to x and saves 
the cost c(k).  By the definition of  t(y -  x, c(k))  her withdrawal increases her 
payoff, so that in no equilibrium does she support party y.  Similarly a player i 
for whom xi > p -  t(y  -  x,  c(k))  does not support party x in any equilibrium. 
Now  consider a player  i for  whom  xi  < x -  t(y -  x, c(k)). If  she does 
not participate then by switching to support party x she changes the outcome 
from ,LL  to x and incurs the cost c(k). By the definition of  t(y -  x,  c(k))  this 
deviation is profitable, so that in no equilibrium does she not participate. 
We conclude that in any Nash equilibrium the action profile satisfies the 
conditions in the result. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Given positive voter turnout, the quota q  is positive. 
We first show that no unelected candidate receives votes.  Suppose to the 
contrary that candidate  i is not  elected  and obtains a  positive measure of 
votes.  Let 6 E (0, q) be the largest measure of  votes received by any unelected 
candidate. Because the quota function is continuous and nondecreasing and R 
is atomless, there exists E > 0 such that the quota remains in (6, q] if an €-club 
of citizens voting for i switches to not voting. Thus these citizens' withdrawal 
does not affect the set of  elected candidates and hence the policy  outcome. 
The members of the e-club decrease their costs, however, contradicting the fact 
that B(a)  is an equilibrium of  the subgame following a.  Thus no unelected 
candidate receives votes. 
We now show that every candidate is elected. We  argue that an unelected candidate who drops out does not  affect  the outcome, and hence increases 
her  payoff.  Suppose that candidate i is not  elected.  Then by the previous 
paragraph she receives no votes. We show that the voting equilibrium B(a)  of 
the subgame Fa in which i is a candidate is also an equilibrium of  the adjacent 
subgame l?(e*a-i)  in which i is not a candidate. Because B(a)  is an equilibrium 
of  Fa we  know that there exists  E  > 0 such that no  e-club has an incentive 
to deviate from B(a) in this subgame.  Choose  v 6  (0, min{e, q)).  For  u 
small enough, when a u-club changes its action from B(a) in the subgame ra, 
candidate i remains unelected, because the quota remains positive.  Therefore, 
if the Y-club changes its action from B(a) in the subgame I'(B,a-z),  the change 
in the policy outcome is the same as it is in the subgame Pa. Consequently, if 
some v-club can profitably change its vote in the subgame l?(Bla-a),  then it can 
also profitably change its vote in the subgame Fa. Thus B(a)  is an equilibrium 
of the subgame l?(eja-l);  subgame persistence implies that B(a) = B(0,  a-i). 
Therefore, candidate i's dropping out reduces her costs, and does not change 
the policy outcome, contradicting the fact that (a,  B) is an equilibrium. Hence 
all candidates are elected. 
The game GB satisfies  C  at a.  Condition C  is satisfied if  we  show that 
there exist no candidate i for whom M(0,  =:  M(a). Assume the contrary. 
We know that the quota is positive and that candidate i, who is elected, gets 
some votes.  However, given M(8,  a+) =. M(a), any small club voting for i can 
profitably withdraw and reduce its cost without changing the policy outcome: 
after its withdrawal the quota does not  go up and all candidates  (with the 
possible exception of  i) remain elected. This contradicts the fact that B(a)  is 
an equilibrium of  the subgame Pa. 
The game GB satisfies PE at a.  First notice that in an equilibrium all 
candidates get exactly the quota of votes, because otherwise some €-club voting 
for a candidate can profitably drop out without changing the election outcome. 
Thus the policy outcome after the election is M(a). 
Now, PE is satisfied if there exists no candidate i and policy 3;  E X with 
a # at such that M(0,  aMj) = M(0,  (x,  u-~)-~)  for each player j 
#{j E I\  {i)  :a, =  ai)  < #{j  €I\ {i): aj  = x). 
Assume that the conditions hold for elected candidate i. We show that i 
can profitably move to x, contradicting the fact that (a,  B) is an equilibrium. 
For any history a*,  denote the set of  small clubs Nash equilibria of  Fa* by 
P(a*). 
Our strategy is to show  that B(a) E  P(x,ali), which  by  subgame per- 
sistence implies that B(x,  = B(a). This is because  candidate i finds it 
profitable to switch to the policy  a,  increase  her prize,  and not change the 
electoral or policy outcomes. 
So to complete the proof  we  prove that B(a) €  P(x, a-i).  Suppose that 
the citizens use the strategy B(a)  in the subgame following (x,  We argue 
that no €-club can profitably deviate from B(a). 
If  an €-club voting for some legislator j stops voting, then j is no longer 
elected  whereas  all other participating legislators are still elected.  But we 
know that M (0,  = M(0, (x,  a_;)- j),  so if  this €-club can profitably drop 
out when the strategy profile is B(a) in the subgame following (x,  then 
it can profitably drop out when  the strategy profile is B(a) in the subgame 
following a, contradicting B(a) E @(a). 
If an &-club  voting for some legislator j switches to voting for legislator j', 
then because all candidates get exactly the quota of votes one of the following 
cases occurs in the subgames following a  and (a,  a-,):  I) only candidate j' 
remains elected, 2) all candidates except j are elected, 3) no candidate remains 
elected, 4) all candidates remain elected. 
In no case is the deviation profitable for the €-club in the  subgame following 
a, because (a,  B) is an equilibrium.  Therefore case 1  for j' # i, and cases 2, 3, 
and 4 are not profitable in the subgame following (x,  a-i),  because they result 
in the same change in the policy outcome for both subgames. For case 1  with 
j'  =  i, there exists another candidate h holding position x.  If  in the subgame 
I'(xra-~)  the €-club can profitably switch its vote from j to i, then  (given the anonymity of  the quota function) in the subgame Fa it can profitably switch 
from j  to h, which contradicts equilibrium. 
A similar argument shows that an +club that does not vote cannot prof- 
itably vote for any candidate j in the F(xla-z),  because such a change does not 
decrease the quota and either only candidate j remains elected or all candi- 
dates remain elected. 
The previous  paragraphs  imply that for some  E  > 0 the members of  no 
€-club can  ~rofitably  change their vote from B(a)  in the subgame following 
(x,  a-i),  completing the proof.  D 
Proof of Proposition 6.3. We know from the proof of  Proposition 6.1 that all 
elected candidates get the quota of votes and candidates that are not elected 
get no votes. 
We need  to show that all candidates are elected.  Suppose by way  of  con- 
tradiction that candidate i is not elected.  We  know from the proof of  Propo- 
sition 6.1 that B(a) E P(0, ali).  Furthermore, (a,  B) is incentive compatible, 
so ((0,  a_$),  B) is incentive compatible because  i is not elected.  Therefore by 
subgame IC-persistence we  have B(0,  = B(a) and i finds it profitable to 
withdraw. Thus all candidates are elected. 
The rest  of  the proof  follows with little modification from the proof  of 
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